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Roundtable Discussion
Friday, February 26, 1999
Vanderbilt University Law School
Nashville, Tennessee
The Symposium panelistsparticipatingin this discussion included
David Aronofsky, Barry S. Engel, Eric Henzy,
Gideon Rothschild, and ProfessorJeffrey A. Schoenblum

Professor Jeffrey Schoenblum:
Welcome to the Roundtable panel discussion.
Each of the speakers is going to open with a few minutes
statement. And then we're going to pose some questions
to open discussion, so it will take people through the
whole asset protection route from beginning to end,
hopefully. And then, any questions you may have we
believe well have sufficient time to ask those questions
and have them answered. You may get very different
views. And then we've just decided that the jury will
decide whether asset protection trusts are a good thing or
a bad thing. Okay. So pay attention.
Let me introduce the speakers, also, at this point.
The first, David Aronofsky is the General Counsel for the
University of Montana, who has written a very interesting
piece on Montana's confidentiality law. He will take some
time in his remarks to explain just what that is and who
it's intended to service.
The next speaker is Gideon Rothschild. He
practices in New York City and also happens to be the
chairman of the relevant American Bar Association
Committee on Asset Protection. And I believe he's in the
process of putting together a book on that very topic.
Our next speaker is Barry Engel from Colorado.
Barry has been the president of the Offshore Trust
Institute. Frankly, I think some people would claim-I
don't know if he would claim-that Barry Engel is the
inventor of the offshore asset protection trust.
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Mr. Barry Engel:
Ill claim that, sure.

Professor Jeffrey Schoenblum:
He'll claim that. So he's a legend. He doesn't look
like a legend. Our last speaker here is Eric Henzy. He is
an attorney who represented the trustee in bankruptcy in
a very famous case from last year, 1998, the Brooks case,
in which he successfully brought onshore assets that the
parties had attempted to put offshore in an asset
protection trust. This particular case, I think, caused
some considerable consternation for proponents of asset
protection trusts, because obviously if you have people
like Mr. Henzy succeeding, it puts a major kink in the
attainability of the objective sought. The Roundtable will
also focus on the new confidentiality act in Montana and
also consider the moves by Alaska and Delaware to bring
some of the asset protection business and trust onshore.
Having seen so much capital flee offshore, is there a way
that asset protection can be afforded onshore? Is the
onshore asset protection trust as efficacious as the
offshore trust, especially since there is obviously a higher
comfort level for clients generally with domestic trust
administration? On the other hand, are there also certain
risks that are not encountered offshore?
So to begin our discussion, why don't we start with
Gideon, please.

Mr. Gideon Rothschild:
Okay. It's a pleasure and an honor to be here at
Vanderbilt Law School. I think that the comments I would
like to address just in the introductory remarks, is to
show you what has occurred in the field of asset
protection planning since I started dealing in this area

about eight or nine years ago.

And at that time, I got

some very disturbing looks from colleagues of mine,
esteemed colleagues in the trust and estates area,
wondering why I would want to entrench myself in such a
speculative area, something that reminded most people of
the movie The Firm, that I'm sure most of you have seen or
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read the book, visioning swaying palm trees in the
Cayman Islands and money laundering in one's mind.
The field has developed over the years and I think,
as evidenced by the recent creation of a committee on
Asset Protection Planning in
the American Bar

Association, it has obtained a reasonable amount of
legitimacy, if you will. Yet, some people still, I think, feel
that it might not be a legitimate device to protect
individuals' wealth from the reach of future creditors. I
think what we need to understand is that this type of
planning, whether it's offshore trust planning or merely a
transfer to a spouse by those people who feel they might
be vulnerable to future creditors, is no different than
engaging in what bankruptcy attorneys normally consider
as pre-bankruptcy planning, which the Supreme Court
has decided is legitimate planning.
In fact, recently there was a case out of, I believe it
was Wisconsin, where an individual had purchased
annuities only a few weeks before he filed for personal
bankruptcy. And the bankruptcy court on the objections
of the trustee in bankruptcy, held that the purchase of the
annuities was not a fraudulent conveyance, was not done
with intent to defraud creditors. And the annuities were
exempt from the bankruptcy estate, because under
applicable non bankruptcy law, that is under that state's
law, annuities are exempt from creditors. Well, what is
the difference, in fact, between a situation like that which,
I view as actually more egregious, than a situation where
you have a doctor who is concerned about the malpractice
environment he or she finds themselves in, or is a high
profile individual in the community who is likely to be
involved in litigation in the future, but has no possible
threats hanging over their heads at the present time, what

is the problem with taking certain steps that they can
take, legally, by using the laws of foreign jurisdictions,
thanks to individuals like Barry Engel, who started this
all, kind of, in the Cook Islands. By taking advantage of
these laws, one can effectively shield one's assets from the
reach of future creditors.
The emphasis on future creditors is critical. The
cases that you might hear about that have been decided
in the last year or two, which Eric will address in his
presentation, I'm sure, and which well discuss in further
detail, are unfortunately cases which had bad facts. As
the saying goes, bad facts make bad law. I hope that the
courts don't simply follow the precedent that has been set
by these decisions in the last year and a half to judge
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whether asset protection planning, if you will, is a
legitimate objective or not. I think that there has been a
misapplication in the law to arrive at the decisions that
the court has arrived at, which I think is the correct
decision, because under those circumstances what

arguably was a fraudulent conveyance, was justified. The
decision of the court was justified, that is, in denying a
discharge to the debtors.
But under the correct circumstances, there should
be nothing wrong with an individual who wishes to protect
his assets by using a trust. whether it be an offshore trust
or an Alaska trust. And in conclusory fashion, I'd like to
simply suggest to you that it is, in fact, perhaps in our
public policy interest, to allow individuals to engage in
asset protection planning onshore rather than offshore,
and enhance the attractiveness of laws like Alaska, like
Delaware. In fact, Colorado even has what many people
don't know, a version of a self-settled spendthrift trust
rule in their own laws for many years, which allows
individuals to protect themselves from unforeseen future
creditors. And just recently I learned that the state of
Texas is considering legislation along the lines of Alaska's
Trust Act, to protect self-settled spendthrift trusts. I think
that this trend should be supported by other states under
conflict of laws rules, and the reason it should be
supported is because the opposite result would otherwise
come about, in that individuals would be forced to go
offshore to seek certainty in their asset protection, and
there will be no recourse to those individuals that have
been wronged, because of fraudulent conveyances
perpetrated by the likes of debtors who use these vehicles
improperly. And I think we'll hear more about this in the
future. And I think I'll just conclude my comments with
that.

Professor Jeffrey Schoenblum:
Thank you very much. Barry, do you want to go
next?

Mr. Barry Engel:
Sure. Good afternoon ladies and gentlemen, it's a
pleasure to be with you here. Nashville is a great place,
and this is a great subject. Certainly one of my top five
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favorites. And I'd like to give you a little bit of perspective,
at least from my point of view, on what asset protection
means to me. Kind of like what did I do this summer for
vacation.
Let's assume I have a million dollars, big
assumption, but let's assume I have a million dollars. I
can hold that million dollars in a managed account,
whether in the U.S. or overseas. And I can hold that in
my own name. And if you're a litigator and you're coming
after me, and I suffer a judgment I could kiss my million
dollars goodbye, because it'1 be gone pretty easily, as
soon as the judgment papers hit the particular
management firm or brokerage house where the account
happens to be. I can rearrange my affairs a little bit, and I
can hold that account, let's say, in a limited partnership.

And under the law, the fact that I am the now ninety-nine
percent limited partner, and the substantial general
partner of that partnership means that I no longer own
the brokerage account, the funds, I own partnership
interests. And under the law, partnership interests are
harder to get, less attractive to the creditor. Additionally, I
can further rearrange my affairs, and I can have a trust
hold the ninety-nine percent partnership interest, and I
can hold an interest as a general partner, thus making it
even more difficult for a creditor someday to get.
In asset protection planning, all we really do at the
end of the day, is to look at how property is held, and
rearrange how property is held so that it's not as
vulnerable as it otherwise was prior to our planning.
That's what we're doing. And we're doing it at a time
when there's nothing, three important words, pending,
threatened, or expected, with respect to the client. We're
doing it in advance. Obviously, it's a little difficult to buy
fire insurance after the fire. Well, it's a little difficult to do
proper asset protection planning if we don't do it prior to
the particular event. Timing is everything. So what we're
talking about is rearranging our affairs so that should
something happen someday, the property is going to be
less attractive and less exposed.
It's really a form of estate planning. In fact, while I
use the term asset protection planning or the phrase asset
protection planning frequently, I think the proper phrase
really is integrated estate planning, for the proper plan
will include aspects of financial planning, estate planning,
and asset protection planning. And my view is, as an
estate planner, which has been my background for more

than twenty years, I hate to say, the fact of the matter is
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estate planners, even today, spend a disproportionate
amount of time on things like minimizing taxes, providing
for the smooth transition of property, etc., avoiding
probate. And those are all important issues, but all of
those important issues mean nothing if something should
happen during the client's lifetime that dissipates the
estate.
So Gideon and I are proponents of what we might
refer to as well as lifetime estate planning. Doing those
things, rearranging the assets in such a way, once again,
so that if something were to happen, then the assets will
be less available, less attractive, and hopefully when all is
said and done, clearly not available. This is based on the
principal, that as a general rule, creditors can get what
you own, not what you once owned. Now, of course there
are some exceptions to that general rule. So, for example,
fraudulent conveyance principles. Fraudulent conveyance
principles will allow the creditor to unwind transfers
made. So if in the normal course of events I transfer half
of my million dollar account to the Red Cross and three
years later I have a creditor problem, that perhaps arose a
year earlier, good luck to a creditor going to the Red Cross
and trying to get the money. However, if there was a fraud
involved, then certainly they're going to have an easier
time.
So part of what we do here is to rearrange the
assets in such a way that will involve to a great extent a
divestiture of assets, giving them away at a time when
there is nothing pending, threatened, or expected, the
client really and truly divesting himself or herself of the
property, but then doing it in a way where the client is
able to retain elements of continued benefit and continued
control. That's inconsistent to some extent, not entirely
with our legal system. It's not inconsistent with other
legal systems or systems of law around the world. And
that is part of the reason why we go offshore for purposes
of our planning.
Final comment I'll make at this time, the age old
question. Ive already heard somebody say, or perhaps
read it in outline here, does this work? It's not that black
and white. I believe the proper frame of reference is
taking a look at where the person otherwise would have
been in the absence of planning. So I've seen cases where
at the conclusion of the matter it was settled for a penny
and a half on the dollar. I think it worked pretty well

there, at least if you were the defendant.

If you're the

plaintiff, maybe your consideration is it didn't work. But

1999]

ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION

if you were the defendant, and it was the assets you
placed in trust that were being attacked a penny and a
half on the dollar is pretty good.
What if the settlement is fifty cents? I think it still
worked. Maybe that's not as good of a settlement, but you
can see the point. Our frame of reference is going to be,
not that we expect to win every judgment or to win every
claim, or to win every challenge or motion. But when all
the dust settles, did the client and the estate come out
better than it otherwise would have? Thank you very
much.
Professor Jeffrey Schoenblum:
For a somewhat different perspective, Eric.
Mr. Eric Henzy:
Professor Schoenblum commented that people like
"that" are getting involved in this area. I think he meant

me.

He's right, people like "that" are getting involved.

What are people like "that"? In fact, I did not take a trust
and estates course in law school. You can now withdraw
the invitation to speak, there's still time. But people like
me are getting involved. I think it's important I tell you
I'm not a trust lawyer for a couple of reasons. One, it's
that any just gross gaps in my knowledge of trust law,
maybe youll be a little forgiving. And two, the growth of
the asset protection industry is bringing people like me
into this field. As more "high net worth"-to use the
politically correct terminology we heard about this
morning-people are using these things more, attorneys
like me, that's creditors rights or commercial litigation
attorneys, are going after these things.
It's also important to know that people like me are
getting involved in this because, and I would argue that
the few cases that have come out would bear this out,
people like me are the people who are sitting on the bench
deciding whether or not these things are going to hold up.
Trust lawyers don't end up as bankruptcy judges. I think
we would probably all agree that the bankruptcy courts
are really going to be the battle grounds on these things.
Commercial litigators, business litigators, and bankruptcy
lawyers end up on bankruptcy benches. They don't speak
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your language. By you, now, I mean you trust lawyer
guys. They speak my language.
And some of the feedback I've gotten on the Brooks
case, some of the things that's made the trust lawyers
most apoplectic, I would say, are not things that are
remarkable at all, I think, to most commercial litigator
types, or probably even to most bankruptcy judges. So I
think that in the years ahead we're going to have some
real collisions of these two areas.
We're supposed to keep these introductory
remarks to five minutes. And I think they were supposed
to be just introductory remarks. But I'm going to cheat a
little bit, and I'm going to respond already to something
Gideon said, and I think to something Professor
Schoenblum said. To the extent I haven't been clear so far,
I think asset protection trusts are a bad thing. From the
individual client's perspective, they're not a bad thing. I
agree with Barry, that a win on these from my perspective
is a percentage on the dollar.
In Brooks we got a
judgment essentially voiding this offshore trust. We then
settled for approximately fifty cents on the dollar, because
the enforcement problems were so significant. But from a
societal perspective, I think that these asset protection
trusts are a bad thing. And with respect to the domestic
asset protection trusts, and by that I mean Alaska and
Delaware, I just disagree as strongly as I can with Gideon.

I'd go further than saying that the asset protection trusts
are a bad thing. I'd say that they are a wrong thing. I
don't mean that they're badly drafted. I don't mean that
they are incorrect or anything like that. I mean, in the
sense that they are bad almost from a moral perspective.
That comment is not directed at practitioners,
because I agree with a remark of Barry's that I think has
made it into print somewhere, and I actually heard him
utter once, which is, I'm not a moralist, I'm a lawyer. And
if the law is there, it's up to me to represent my client as
vigorously as I can. I don't think the same is true of
legislatures and of state governments. I think that
legislatures and state governments have to take ethical
issues and morals and justice into account when they're
passing laws. I think that-

Mr. Barry Engel:

Is that yours or mine?
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Mr. Eric Henzy:
All of ours. And, again, I'm not talking about
offshore jurisdictions-

Mr. Barry Engel:
That's a tall order.

Mr. Eric Henzy:
-but I think that with respect to states, we do or
we ought to share at least some thin or minimal ideas of
justice. And one of those has always been that when you
do something wrong, you have to pay for it. The liability
system is, and has always been, one of our chief
mechanisms for controlling human behavior. I'd like it,
we'd all like it, if people did what was right because it was
right, but they don't. The liability system has always, and
it still does, control people's behavior. Doctors practice
good medicine, people drive safely, and people perform
their contracts at least in part because if they don't, they
know that they may be deprived of wealth. And if you
take that away, I think that it causes significant problems
for our society.
So again, to the extent that I haven't been clear, I
think that these are a bad thing.
And I think it's
outrageous that states in the United States are passing
these type of schemes.

Professor Jeffrey Schoenblum:

Thank you for your very mild remarks. That's why
we wanted you here. Thank you. Next, we're going to
have remarks from David Aronofsky.
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Mr. David Aronofsky:
I think I can counterpoint that on behalf of the
Montana Legislature by saying that all but four of our 150
legislators would strongly disagree with most of what Eric
just said. I'm probably here because (a) I'm Montana's
only international law professor at the state's only law
school; (b) the state's only legislation professor at the
state's only law school; and (c) probably the only
somewhat of an expert in the state that had nothing
whatsoever to do with the deliberations and subsequent
enactment of Montana's Foreign Capital Depository Act,
which plainly and simply is a 1997 law that creates an
onshore non-bank bank, strictly for offshore, that is nonU.S. assets. No U.S. money need apply, at least for now.
The sponsor and I have had lengthy discussions about
when, not whether, the Act will be amended to eliminate
the bar against U.S. dollars coming into the non-bank
banks.
We're presently in the process in Montana of
sorting through the thousands, not hundreds, but
thousands of inquiries to get down to the five or six
serious ones from financial services companies which are
interested enough and affluent enough, and sophisticated
enough to take out a charter in our foreign capital
depository and become depositories so that they can bring

offshore capital into Montana. Our legislature did it for a
very simple reason. Montana needs the money and has a
very conservative anti-tax legislature dominating both
houses. Tax increases are politically a non-starter. And
even if they were, to pass them, our voters would probably
repeal the increases at the ballot box, which they tend to
do. So we have to find revenue from other sources, and
we've created a series of incentives to do that in the
Foreign Capital Depository Act that's been on the books
for a little bit less than two years.
Much to my pleasant surprise, even though I was
perhaps the state's leading skeptic when this law was
adopted, I've been talking with a number of people around
the world, primarily but not solely, general counsels for
large financial institutions and trust companies in Latin
America, and Asia and Europe, and I'm finding quite a bit
of what appears to be significant interest in our law.
We're talking through several of the reasons that it's
unique, not the least of which is the subject Professor
Jeffrey Schoenblum would like me to say a few words

1999]

ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION

about, and that's Montana's unique confidentiality and
privacy laws.
We have by our own State Supreme Court's
express intent in a series of decisions dating back
practically to the 1972 Constitution itself, the toughest
U.S. privacy laws, bar none. That's intended. It will
probably never be repealed. Never may be a strong term,
but I think that anyone who would doubt my words about
that need merely talk to our sheriffs, police chiefs, and
attorney general, because they often lose privacy law
cases that go up to the Supreme Court when individual
privacy is concerned.
In fact, I was a little sympathetic to Mr. Brownbill's
comments this morning about drafting legislation that
doesn't seem to go anywhere. My law students and I draft
lots of good bills that never go anywhere. But one of the
ones that we drafted this past fall that passed, was a
codification of a new Montana Supreme Court case that
imposes a very, very high legal threshold to obtain civil
information subject to confidentiality and privacy
protection.
Why is that relevant to the Foreign Capital
Depository Act? Because our legislature, in its effort to
attract offshore capital into the state, has imposed some
extremely rigorous criminal and civil penalties on the
breach of confidentiality by our public officials on
financial information related to these depositories and
their customers. In fact, not only can officials be removed
from office summarily, they can also go to jail if they
disclose information about depositories and their
customers. And I don't think our courts would have any
trouble either imposing a conviction or affirming it on
appeal if someone was dumb enough to breach that.
So I think that we have come at the asset
protection game from a somewhat unique perspective.
One, it's aimed at attracting offshore capital; two, it's
aimed at protecting information about their capital once
it's in Montana; and three, and this is where I think Eric
would have a lot of trouble in our state, if he were called
upon to represent offshore creditors trying to seek the
assets in the depositories, we did something that I don't
think any state in the country has ever had the nerve to
do, and that is to amend the Uniform Judgment
Enforcement and Recognition Statutes in Montana to
make it almost impossible to recognize or enforce a money
judgment from a non-U.S. corporation against a
depository customer.
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As you all probably know, comity is the primary

reason that non-U.S. court judgments get enforced in this
country. Our legislature has effectively eviscerated comity
and codified this evisceration in the statute. It would be
exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, I think, to get
around this barrier to judgment enforcement and
recognition when the judgment is issued from a non-U.S.
court.
One of the initial skeptics besides me on this law
was the U.S. Treasury Department. The money laundering folks were quite sensitive, anxious, nervous, cynical,
and a few other adjectives I won't describe here, about
whether Montana could, in fact, adopt such a statutory
scheme without running afoul of the money laundering
laws. I'm pleased to say the legislature was probably
ahead of the Feds on that one, for what may be the most
unique aspect of this law. We statutorily preempted our
own state laws to the extent a federal money laundering
statute or regulation conflicts with the Foreign Capital
Depository Act. In the words of the sponsor of the
legislation, this is intended to be snow white pure, to the
extent human beings can make that happen.
On the other hand, and there is another hand or

two, one of the interesting academic issues that involves
state laws which attempt to regulate the financial
activities is the extent to which the U.S. Constitution's
Eleventh Amendment (a) makes it legally impermissible
for the federal government to come after state agencies
and officials for their own financial services regulatory
activities in conflict with federal law, and (b) precludes
even treaty application in such instances to states and
their officials.
I would refer to a couple of footnotes in my paper
about some very contemporary law review articles by
distinguished legal scholars who have elaborated these
points far more than I can here.
The other issue that's kind of interesting to me,
and should be interesting to those of us who look at
international treaties and agreements, is whether or not
even international agreements and even treaties can be
applied against state governments and their officials.
Those of you who are familiar with the Breard case
involving Paraguay versus the United States on the death
penalty case, already know that our Supreme Court
refused on Eleventh Amendment, and a few other
grounds, to apply treaty law which, was clearly violated by
the state government, against the State of Virginia and its
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officials to stop a death penalty case. The Court cited the
Eleventh Amendment as the basis for doing that. Sandra
Day O'Connor was on our campus less than a year ago for

the second time in the last few years, and made crystal
clear that at least five of the nine justices so strongly
believe in the Eleventh Amendment, that the other four
probably better reassess their whole approach to judging.
In her words and based upon the Court's opinions, four of
her colleagues and she view this whole sovereignty
concept as co-equal, not the state subservient to the Feds
when the Feds feel like it. Now that we have federal
regulation of financial activity by the states being called
into question under Eleventh Amendment immunity
grounds, it lends even more interesting credence to those
in Montana who say we are unique and like it that way.
Time will tell whether it really happens.
Professor Jeffrey Schoenblum:
Thank you very much. We're going to take the
asset protection trust step by step. But before we get to
that, I do want to raise a point with each side here. With
regard to the fellows who are speaking in favor of the
trust, how can you so easily distinguish control from
ownership?
And then on the other side, Eric, you said, well,
people should pay a price for their mistakes, and so forth.
But what if you have a tort structure that exacts an
unfairly high price?
Mr. Barry Engel:
Well, I would suggest that there's a tremendous
difference between the design of the typical, revocable
living trust than the design of the typical, if there is such
a thing, irrevocable trust, domestic irrevocable trust, then
the design of a foreign based irrevocable trust. So I don't
have much difficulty with the differences because of the
design and perhaps the intentions of the settlors with
respect to each. And with respect to the ability to access
assets in a revocable living trust, I really think that that
result is the appropriate result, particularly if the
individual has the ability to revoke the trust.

792

VANDBRBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 32:779

Professor Jeffrey Schoenblum:
Well, how much control, then, do you have to give
up in terms of an effective asset protection trust?
Mr. Barry Engel:
I've seen cases where minimal to no control was
given up, and the results were effective when challenged,
and I've seen the opposite of that. I think every case may
be different. I believe clearly there is the distance factor.
In other words, there is no question that the more
distance a settlor puts between the assets and himself or
herself, the more effective it'll be, ultimately, if challenged.
So if we have a foreign trust that has the assets that are
held in two or three different foreign jurisdictions, and the
settlor is not a beneficiary, and the settlor is not a
protector and has no other controls, that's on a one to ten
scale, probably a 9.9 protection-wise. But from a flexibility point of view, meaning retained benefit and retained
control, that's probably a two.
In my view, we can increase on that flexibility scale
to perhaps an eight, again retain benefit, retain control,
move way up on that scale, and only give up a little bit of
ultimate protection, but, yes, some protection is given up,
it is surrendered. So I think that that's a fair trade-off. A
lot of clients will give up a little bit of ultimate protection
in exchange for a big increase in flexibility, but certainly
that may come back to haunt them. But as a planner, it's
my job to determine at the outset, how far they want to go.
How protective of a structure they want.
After all,
Professor, I can design something for them that is so

protective that when the time goes and they need it, even
they can't get it, and they may sue me. But I, of course,
was my first own asset protection client, so I'm not
worried.
Mr. Eric Henzy:
Well, on the question of a tort structure that's out
of control, that's interesting. Barry and I spoke at a
program in Connecticut in November.
One of the
speakers was an attorney from Alaska named Rich
Hompesch. Rich Hompesch had a lot to do with drafting
the Alaska statute and obviously he's practicing in this
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area. And II1 try to report faithfully, and Barry can call
me on it if I don't, one of the things he said there in terms
of the reasons why Alaska did this.
One of the reasons Alaska did this is because they
looked around, looked down to the lower forty-eight, and
they decided that our tort systems were out of control and
they were going to do something about that. Well, if
Tennessee and Tennesseans decide that Tennessee's tort
system is out of control, Tennessee can do something
about that. Tennessee can pass legislation that reigns in
the tort system. For example, limits punitive damages, or
limits what attorneys can take away. Connecticut has
done that. There's restrictions on how much an attorney

can take away in contingency fee cases.

All kinds of

restrictions to try to reign in the system, provide
protection in medical malpractice cases for doctors. In
Connecticut we have had obstetrician/gynecologists
deciding to be just gynecologists, because they're tired of
getting sued. Connecticut can do something about that,
Tennessee can do something about that. But the notion
that three or four hundred thousand people in Alaska
ought to be deciding what folks in the lower forty-eight
ought to be doing about their tort systems, it's just not
supportable.

Mr. Barry Engel:

So then you don't like the concept of twenty
thousand people on the Cook Islands deciding what the
state of Tennessee, I take it-

Mr. Eric Henzy:
I don't. But it's not as offensive to me as domestic
jurisdictions doing it. Because my point is that states in
the United States ought to be sharing some minimal ideas
of justice. The Cook Islands may have very different ideas
of justice or what legal systems ought or ought not to have
in them. So I don't like it that the twenty thousand people
in the Cook Islands do it, but I like it even less that-I
don't know how many people like in Alaska, I think it's not

very many-people in Alaska decide what's in the best
interests of people down here. And I'm going on, but
frankly I don't really buy it, that that's the reason.
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My concern, or my belief, is that what we really
have here is what David Brownbill, I think the point he
was making was about Delaware corporate law, referred to
as law for sale. In the case of the Alaska statute, it was
drafted by a New York attorney who's brother is the
president of the Alaska Trust Company, and somehow or
other the legislature of Alaska decided that it was a good
thing to pass this law. I think what we have in Alaska,
and what we have in Delaware now, is law for sale.
Mr. Barry Engel:
But, again, that's nothing new. I don't think.
Mr. Eric Henzy:
It's nothing new, but it doesn't mean that we have
to be happy about it. Also, I view this to the extent that
these asset protection trusts do well. And I'm assuming
that both of you guys hope they do really well, and Rich
Hompesch hopes theyl do really well in Alaska. The
potential impact on our society is so great that maybelaw should never be for sale-but maybe it's better to have
little law for sale than big law for sale, and I view this as
big law for sale.
Mr. Barry Engel:
But isn't that a double-edged sword? I mean, you
talk about the impact on society. You have obstetricians
who are no longer practicing. You have people who are
hesitant to go into business in certain areas-I mean,
there is a huge cost to what has gone on in the last ten to
twenty years as a result of what some would call, and not
necessarily myself, believe it or not, but what some would
call a legal system run amuck. So there are going to be
costs on either side of that fence. And I believe very
strongly that asset protection planning is truly a response
to a problem. And if you fix the problem, whatever the
hell that means, but if you fix the problem, then the
interest in asset protection planning will go away.
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Mr. Eric Henzy:
So Barry's argument is that there's a few-

Mr. Barry Engel:
One of my arguments-there's a lot to say.
Mr. Eric Henzy:
-he has lots of arguments. But one of his
arguments is, there's a few people out there, twenty
thousand people on the Cook Islands, and some small
number of people in Alaska, that are-can figure out that
we all down here have got it wrong, and that they know
how to fix it and get it right.
Mr. Barry Engel:
I wouldn't say that.
Mr. Eric Henzy:
And that's just-it's just not supportable.
Mr. Barry Engel:
I wouldn't say it that way.
Professor Jeffrey Schoenblum:
Now, Gideon.
Mr. Gideon Rothschild:
Let me just point out a couple of things here in
terms of if I was a bankruptcy lawyer, a creditor's-rights
attorney, I think number one I'd probably be more
inclined to support the Alaska law, because I think that it
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would give creditor's-rights attorneys and creditors certain
avenues to succeed against those who wrongfully use the

laws. We do have a balancing mechanism in our society,
and that is called fraudulent conveyance law. The statute
of limitations for fraudulent conveyance in New York is six
years and in many other states it's four years. In Alaska
there's a four-year statute. If someone creates a trust to
be governed by Alaska law and transfers assets to an
Alaska trust a creditor will have the right to challenge that
transfer on fraudulent conveyance grounds for a period of
four years from the date of the transfer, or if they were a
creditor existing at the time that the trust was created,
then they have up to one year from the date of discovery,
or when they should have reasonably discovered the
transfer. And so there are protective mechanisms for
wrongfully transferring assets to a trust.
Now, I am a proponent of foreign trusts more so
than domestic trusts for asset protection reasons, for the
reason that they haven't been tested. And as long as we
have a concern about whether full faith and credit will
recognize an Alaska trust established by a New York
resident or a Tennessee resident, there remains that
uncertainty as to the efficacy of these structures. But if
states would recognize the validity of these trusts, I think
that it would serve a tremendous public policy objective,
because, number one, the Internal Revenue Service
wouldn't be worried about losing trillions of dollars to
offshore trusts that would then be out of their control, out
of their reach without any way to ensure that there is
proper reporting and proper payment of taxes, as there
would be if people would use Alaska or Delaware trusts.
And creditors would not have the ability to recover assets
in the event of a fraudulent conveyance situation. So I
think having the Alaskan trust legislation actually

enhances the creditor's rights.

Mr. David Aronofsky:
Federal law, under the Full Faith and Credit
provision of the U.S. Constitution, gives a bankruptcy
court in almost every instance the power to override any
state law that I can think of, number one. Number two, I
was reading a lot of Barry's materials earlier this morning,
and he talks, I think in one of your cases, about the
court's approach. You may not reach the assets, but you
can reach the person who controls them in a lot of the
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trusts that we talked about this morning. It seems to me
that between preemptive power in a bankruptcy court
judgment and control over the individual who controls the
assets offshore, there are plenty of legal ways to address
the problems that you're citing, Eric.

Professor Jeffrey Schoenblum:
If we could go on at this stage to a few, almost
bullet responses and then get a little more deeply into
some issues and take some questions. Just to lay it out
for those, particularly who aren't familiar with all the
aspects of this. Just a basic question, who is a good
candidate and who is not a good candidate for an asset
protection trust, presumably offshore, but maybe we can
even distinguish that, and consider Alaska and Delaware
as well.

Mr. Barry Engel:
I would suggest if somebody has a net worth of a
million plus, perhaps half million that's liquid, they are a
good candidate for asset protection planning. There's a
number of tools they could look at, not just the trust. And
then of course, as the net worth increases, they're all the
more a candidate, I believe, for the foreign trust. I think
they should keep in mind that your million is going to
mean as much to you as my five million means to me, as
Gideon's fifty million means to him.

Professor Jeffrey Schoenblum:
Well, that gets to the next question, which is
what's the cost?
Because I think on a cost/benefit
analysis, you know, the million, you're taking a larger
piece of it to set this up, and especially if you have to
defend it and so forth.

Mr. Gideon Rothschild:
Well, I think youll find different fees charged by
different folks. I've seen Bermuda trusts promoted to be
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set up for as little as fifteen hundred dollars, by some
organizations, not law firms, out of Bermuda.
Professor Jeffrey Schoenblum:
Does this require you to lower your fees?
Mr. Gideon Rothschild:
No, we just don't recommend those trusts.
Professor Jeffrey Schoenblum:
All right. For a good solidMr. Gideon Rothschild:

And I've seen, you know, good lawyers charging
anywhere between, I'd say fifteen and thirty thousand
dollars to set these offshore trusts up.
Professor Jeffrey Schoenblum:
How about the administrative costs?
Mr. Gideon Rothschild:
The administrative costs, actually, are not that
expensive. The ongoing administrative expenses of these
trusts, generally most of the foreign trustees, as well as the
Alaska trusts that I've dealt with, and Delaware, because
they're not actively managing the portfolio, usually-because
often times there will be a custodian bank that's managing
the portfolio and charging a management fee, or the settlor
him or herself will be managing the portfolio through a
structure like a limited partnership or a limited liability
company that they retain control over-the foreign trustees
charge a fee typically running around two to four thousand
dollars per year. And then you have the ongoing
administrative requirements of filing tax returns assuming
you're a U.S. resident. You have to file, under the foreign
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trust reporting requirement, Forms 3520, 3520A, that I'm
sure Carlyn McCaffrey, tomorrow, will be discussing.
Professor Jeffrey Schoenblum:
How do you actually go about setting up one of
these? I know that you call, perhaps, one of the persons
on the panel. But other than that, what are the actual
steps?
Mr. Gideon Rothschild:
You don't have to fly to the Cook Islands.
Professor Jeffrey Schoenblum:
That's what I want to clarify.

Mr. Gideon Rothschild:
That's about an eighteen-hour plane ride, and I
don't think anybody here-unless you enjoy scuba diving,
there's really no reason to fly there.
Professor Jeffrey Schoenblum:
So let's say we had somebody in the audience who
is not a lawyer, but is actually interested in an asset
protection trust. Do they pick up the phone, and just call
their local lawyer, or do they call the Cayman Islands, do
they call, for example, Antony Duckworth in the Cayman
Islands, or what do they do?
Mr. Gideon Rothschild:
Well, they can certainly call Antony in the Cayman
Islands. Cayman Islands has a six year statute of
limitations for such trusts, and Antony may even suggest
a different jurisdiction be used other than the Cayman
Islands. Or they can call a U.S. attorney, but I would
recommend that whoever is called should be someone
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who really specializes in this field. This is an area that
you generally wouldn't want to be dealing with a rookie, if
you will, no different than going in for heart bypass
surgery and dealing with an internist. I think that this
area is so complicated in that it evolves around not only
foreign trust law, but it also includes domestic tax issues,
foreign tax issues,
and fraudulent
conveyance
debtor/creditor issues, that anyone involved in this field
has to have a multi-disciplinary approach in order to do it
effectively.
Mr. David Aronofsky:
There are also treaty issues. You do have to look
at what treaties your offshore jurisdictions have and
haven't signed, because if one of them involves a
judgment recognition and enforcement treaty without
exceptions, you may be going to the wrong place if and
when you're ever hit with a valid judgment.
Professor Jeffrey Schoenblum:
David, can you expand on that a little bit. What is
a judgment recognition and enforcement treaty? What is
the impact of it? How does it work?
Mr. David Aronofsky:
The way it would work, I think, would be when a
jurisdiction, and I'm going to use a hypothetical, Cayman
Islands, were exercising its sovereign power and
subscribing to an international agreement that its own
courts would recognize as binding law in that jurisdiction.
Most jurisdictions, other than the U.S. take- the position
that international law which conflicts with domestic law
supersedes domestic law. That's independently of whether
any international court, such as the European Court of
Justice, might issue a binding judgment on a member
country of the European Union. I would want to know
whether any of these jurisdictions do, in fact, find
themselves bound under an international convention or
agreement by a judgment enforcement and recognition
convention of any kind that would permit a judgment
outside that jurisdiction to be recognized and enforced if it
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comes from another signatory country, and whether there
are any exceptions that would permit trusts, for example,
to be excluded from that sort of a judgment enforcement
or recognition. Very few U.S. lawyers could know that
without consulting foreign counsel of a very high caliber.
Professor Jeffrey Schoenblum:
Okay. We're moving along. How do I decide which is
the appropriate jurisdiction for an asset protection
structure? What are the attributes that I'm looking for in
those jurisdictions? There must be some key factors that I
want to concern myself with. You don't have to get into the
specific choices.
Mr. Barry Engel:
No, no. Let me just say that I think there are two
schools of thought here on the question of where to go.
One is that we want to go to a jurisdiction that has
statutory specificity, meaning that a jurisdiction that has
specific law addressing the many issues associated with
the particulars of asset protection trusts. I like statutory
specificity. I settled a case very recently. A client was
sued a year ago. He thought I would be too expensive to
call, so he went through the litigation process. And after
spending about a hundred thousand dollars, he called me.
He said, wasn't that trust I set up a couple of years ago
supposed to do something? I said, well, yes. Bottom line
to that was, once we sent a copy of the specific law to the
adversary counsel, together with a letter of explanation as

to how the trust comes in to play, within a week the case
settled, and settled very cheaply. So I like statutory
specificity. The other school of thought is, you want to go
somewhere where the law doesn't look like designer
legislation, because thatll look good to a judge some day.
So those are the two school of thought.
I do prefer the specific approach. I will say there
are two concurrent elements. You need a good team and
you need a good jurisdiction. You can have the best law
in the world, and if you don't have the right team in place,
i.e., foreign funds managers, foreign trustees, foreign
counsel, etc., the paper work is going to do you no good.
You need the good team, you need the good counterparts.
I'd rather, in a way, have a good team and bad law or a
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bad jurisdiction, than a bad team and good law or a good
jurisdiction. Ideally, you have both. I'll stop there, unless
you want me to mention some of the elements you look for
a ina specific-

Professor Jeffrey Schoenblum:
Yes, I think that would be very helpful.
Mr. Barry Engel:
For example, I'll
name the six that I deem to be the
most important. I like it when a jurisdiction, and it's law,
says specifically that we will not recognize foreign
judgments. You need to come here and sue from scratch
in a trial de novo on the merits of the case. I like a
jurisdiction for my clients that has a heavy burden of
proof, such as if they're going to attempt to show a
fraudulent transfer, that fraudulent intent existed beyond
reasonable doubt, as opposed to by the standard of clear
and convincing evidence or by the standard of
preponderance of the evidence. I like a short statute of
limitations. Two years is the outside provision in the Cook
Islands. The U.S. Bankruptcy Court has a one year
statute, Gibraltar claims an instant protection or zero.
You know, one man's "too long" is another man's "too
short." So who's to say, in way, who is right and who is
wrong, it just depends on which side of the fence you're
on.
I also like certainty in the law that a settlor can be
a beneficiary without impinging the efficacy of the
structure, of the planning structure. I like statutory
certainty that the settlor can retain the control. And
finally, out of the fifteen that I've identified, anyway,
number six would be I like that the burden of proving
fraudulent intent is always on the creditor, as opposed to
under U.S. law in some circumstances, it does shift to the
settlor or the transferor.
Mr. Gideon Rothschild:
Obviously, a subset, I think of this consideration is
whether you go offshore, to a jurisdiction offshore, or
whether you remain onshore, meaning Alaska or
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Delaware. And I think if the primary motivation for
establishing such a trust is protection from future
creditors, I think one still has to be concerned about the
uncertainty that exists by remaining onshore, unless
you're an Alaska resident or a Delaware resident. If you
live outside of those jurisdictions, you have to deal with
the conflicts of law concerns and the recognition of
judgments and the U.S. Constitution. And until that gets
resolved, it's anybody's guess.
Professor Jeffrey Schoenblum:
We're going to get into that after a little while, but I
want to pick up with you, Eric. Barry said he prefers a
tight statute. From your standpoint, which do you prefer?
If you're attacking these. He talked about that making it
easier from his side.

Mr. Eric Henzy:
Everything Barry said, just turn it around, and
that's what I prefer.
Mr. Barry Engel:
I said you were a nice guy.
Mr. Eric Henzy:
That, too.
Professor Jeffrey Schoenblum:
This is really interesting. They happen to have a
business, a real partnership, developing here.
Mr. Eric Henry:
The thing I prefer the most, and this kind of picks
up on what Gideon was saying, is that it be a domestic
trust. That may sound inconsistent with what I was

804

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 32:779

saying. I think these domestic trusts are bad. But I
would go further than Gideon that there's uncertainty
with these domestic trusts. I think they won't work.
Professor Jeffrey Schoenblum:
Wait, before you go any further, can we pin you
down-okay. Barry or Gideon has set up one of these
trusts, and let's say it's offshore. What would your
arguments be to bring down the trust that one of these
guys has set up? You've already done this in fact, winning
a great case.
Mr. Eric Henzy:
I assume, and usually this is, I think, going to be
the case, if I have to go to the Cook Islands, or I have to
rely on the Cook Islands fraudulent conveyance statute or
certainly if I have to rely on Gibraltar or Belize law, I lose.

The attack in the Brooks case that I was involved in, and
the attack in the Portnoy case, which is a case out of the
Southern District of New York, was that the Belize, or the
Cook Islands, or whatever the offshore jurisdiction's law it
is, is not the applicable law.
The real battle ground in those cases was a choice
of law issue. The bank that was aggrieved in the Portnoy
case won on that. My client won in the Brooks case on
The judge found the Connecticut law was
that.
applicable. And once you get-because what we're talking
about is asset protection trust, remember, is self-settled
trust. The settlor is the beneficiary. And in the Brooks
case, the trustee of those trusts could distribute all the
income and all of the principal. It was an irrevocable
trust. But I'm not sure what irrevocable means if I
distribute all of the rights of the trust and I'm left with an
empty box, but all of the property is out of the trust.
And the judge found that Connecticut law was
applicable for determining the validity of the trust. In
forty-eight out of fifty states, the spendthrift provision in a
self-settled trust is not valid. So once you win on the
choice of law issue, you win. And that's what I argued
throughout the case, that if I won on the choice of law
issue I won.
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Professor Jeffrey Schoenblum:
What if there is not mandatory access to the trust
by the settlor, it's discretionary with the trustee?
Mr. Eric Henzy:
It really doesn't matter, because whether a trust is
mandatory or discretionary, in most U.S. jurisdictions
with a self-settled trust the spendthrift provision of the
trust is not valid. The creditors can get at the res of the
trust. So whether it's revocable or it's irrevocable, or it's
mandatory or discretionary, on a self-settled trust theory,
it really doesn't make any difference.
Mr. Barry Engel:
Can I respond to that? I don't know, really that
that's entirely correct. You look at the typical pension
trust, where you have, if I may, the doctors who are the
shareholders in the pc, they're the trustees of the trust,
and they're the principal participants under the plan. As
a matter of federal law, and indeed, exemption law under
most states, that self-settled trust is protected in that
particular instance. Colorado has a statute going back to
the 1850s that says I can create a trust and I can be a
beneficiary of that trust, and it will not be available to my
creditors who don't exist today, or come along in the
foreseeable future, so long as I am not the primary
beneficiary, that type of self-settled trust that Gideon
already mentioned.
I would guess twelve or fifteen states have a similar
statute on the books. So I don't really know that there's

such a huge difference conceptually or philosophically
between what jurisdictions like, the Cook Islands have
done, what jurisdictions like Gibraltar have done, and so
on. I don't know that there's such a huge gap between
what they have done and really what we have here, when
you take a hard look at U.S. domestic trust law.
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Mr. Gideon Rothschild:
I think when you look at the Portnoy case and you
look at the Brooks case, as you've mentioned, public
policy played a role in that decision because of the bad
facts. The court cited section 270 of the Restatement of
Conflict of Laws as the basis for invalidating the trust in
those cases. Both of those cases, however, involved
transfers which were arguably fraudulent at the time.
Given these egregious facts, it is not surprising, I
admit, that the court found a way to invalidate the trust. I
submit to you, though, that at the American Law
Institute-ABA video program that I participated in about
six months ago we had the Chief Judge of the Bankruptcy
Court of Mobile, Alabama, provide an example in a nonegregious situation. Let's take a very straightforward
situation. An individual who has a masters in business
becomes an investment banker, he makes five million
dollars, and then he decides he's had enough of
investment banking. He wants to go to medical school.
And he goes to medical school and opens up this practice.
And he's got this five million dollars now, at risk, for
which there is no protection. He's not married, he can't
transfer these assets to his spouse. Perhaps even if he is
married, he doesn't want to transfer it to his spouse for
other reasons, among them being that most marriagesover fifty percent of all marriages end in divorce. And so
he needs to do something with these assets. Now, he's
not yet raised the scalpel on his first patient, and he
transfers his five million dollars to an offshore trust that's
created by Barry. Should that individual, if five years
later he is charged with a negligent act, not be able to
protect his assets using an offshore trust?
The
bankruptcy judge's own opinion of that situation would be
that there's nothing wrong with such a transfer.
There's nothing wrong either morally, ethically, or
legally with structuring the trust at the correct moment in
time when there are no foreseeable creditors on the
horizon. This is no different than any other prebankruptcy planning that debtors' attorneys very often
recommend.
One last point. I suggest to you to look at section
273 of the Restatement of Conflict of Laws, and see that
public policy is not a consideration in section 273. The
courts, importantly in Brooks, dealt with section 270.
Section 270 deals with validating a trust provided it does
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not offend a strong public policy with respect to the
particular matter at issue. The particular issue here is
not the validity of the trust, but whether the spendthrift
clause should apply or not. And with respect to that, the
conflict of laws under section 273 seem to dictate that the
law designated by the settlor should apply. We can look
at a number of cases, not in the foreign trust area, but in
the domestic trust arena, where the choice of law that the
settlor designated-there was a Massachusetts case that
dealt with a Vermont resident who used a Massachusetts
trust, dictated that Massachusetts law should apply to
that trust, in order to avoid his spouse's rights under the
elective share rules in Vermont. And the Massachusetts
court held that Massachusetts law would govern since a
settlor has the distinct right under the Conflict of Laws
Rules to designate the law in which he or she wants to
have the trust governed under. And there are a number of
other cases like that, and I think that the only reason we
got the results in Portnoy and Brooks, and now there's a
more recent case out of Florida, is because of the
egregious facts that surrounded those cases.
Mr. Eric Henzy:
I don't agree.
Professor Jeffrey Schoenblum:
All right. Let me go on to another point, because
it's something that I've always wondered about, and
maybe it can be clarified. As a practical matter, the client
now wants to know how much, in the way of assets,
should be transferred. I think I'd feel a little
uncomfortable transferring all of my assets, but on the
other hand, if I don't transfer all of my assets and there's
a judgment, can't they just take all my assets I kept in
order to make up for the ones they can't reach?
Mr. Barry Engel:
Well, I always advise clients to leave out at least
$18,500, which is my fee, and then beyond that.... No,
different people will have different goals. Some clients
very clearly have in mind nest egging a portion of the
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estate. So perhaps twenty percent, perhaps a third of the
estate is transferred. One of my clients refers to that, I
think, very descriptively as his "go to hell" money. If
everything falls apart, he has that. Other clients wish to
take a more aggressive approach.
As a principle I always tell people something has to
be left on the table, the more you transfer the more of a
chance that you're going to be taken a look at if something
happens in close time here. I would hesitate to transfer
all but say ten or twenty percent of the estate, but, of
course, that changes with the size of the estate, the nature

of the business or profession of the individual, how close
to retirement they are, what their track record it. After all,
we might take a different approach for a high profile
surgeon who for twenty years has never had a problem, as
opposed to somebody who has been in practice for five
years, and seems to be under a black cloud all of the time.
In that case, we may not take the case at all.
And I think a very important point for those of you
who have an interest in this and want to get into this area,
or are maybe already in the area, is definitely don't feel
compelled to take every case that comes in the door, there
is too much good work out there. And the bad stuff could
haunt you. You can have your license to practice pulled,
you could have criminal sanctions imposed, you can be
subject to civil liability. So over the course of the last ten
or twelve years, we have structured around a thousand of
these in our firm. We've had about fifty come under
attack, so roughly five percent of what we have structured
has come under attack, and I think that's a relatively low
percentage when you consider the profile of the people
that we have done this work for. And I think it's a low
number because we are careful with respect to that big
question of who do you take and how do you structure
your planning.

Professor Jeffrey Schoenblum:

What would the actually preferred structure of this
asset protection arrangement be?

Barry mentioned a

partnership and a trust, I don't know what procedure you
use, Gideon, but for someone who is trying to get a picture
of how this works, how would it work? I know Barry has
this famous ladder that he uses to demonstrate the
various steps in the provision of an asset protection
structure. And it's not all offshore asset protection trusts
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and partnerships. There are domestic structures as well.
But what would you do?

Mr. Gideon Rothschild:
I think I'd use a similar approach to Barry, but I
think it depends on the client at the end of the day. If a
client wants the maximum protection and he's willing to
give up some flexibility and control, obviously the
maximum protection is to move the assets physically
offshore when there's no problem on the horizon and put
it into the hands of a trustee. You can imagine, though,
that most clients that might walk into my office, when I
explain to them that they're going to take their life
savings, perhaps, and transfer them to a Cook Islands'
trustee, their reaction might be a what, where? Where are
the Cook Islands? You know, I've got to pull out my atlas
that I have in my office and point to where the Cook
Islands are, let alone explain to them what this trustee
might do with their money.
Many clients would prefer something just short of
actually transferring their assets offshore, especially when
there's no real threat on the horizon. And we might, in
those situations, use a combination of structures. We
might set up a partnership, for example, where the client,
who is the general partner of his partnership, transfers a
million dollars into the entity. He would retain a one
percent interest. A ninety-nine percent interest in that
partnership then would be assigned immediately to his

foreign trust, appointing a foreign trustee as the trustee of
that trust. And in that fashion, divesting himself, for all
intents and purposes, of ninety-nine percent of the equity
in that partnership. Any representations to a lender in
future financial statements would only reflect that he
owns a one percent interest in that structure with his
trust owning now a ninety-nine percent interest. He can
be a discretionary beneficiary of that trust, if he wishes,
assuming that the jurisdiction designated allows him to
remain a beneficiary of that trust. His spouse, if he is
married, and his children may also be discretionary
beneficiaries of that trust, as well as charities and any
other individuals he would like to favor, either during his

lifetime or upon his death.

And this trust would also

serve the purpose of being his primary dispositive

instrument for estate planning purposes.
It would
contain, just like his will, his credit shelter provisions, his
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marital trust provisions, and his generation-skipping trust
provisions, and the trust would become, in effect, his will
substitute.

Mr. David Aronofsky:
I've got a question for Gideon on the discretionary
beneficiary. How do you deal with a U.S. court order that
tells you to exercise your discretion, with no latitude.

Mr. Gideon Rothschild:
Okay. Good question. Well, remember that you,
the beneficiary, don't have the discretion-the discretion
is in the trustee who must exercise discretion either in
your favor or someone else's favor. Now, if that trustee is,
in fact, a foreign trustee, then the U.S. court order would
be ineffective against that trustee, because there's no
jurisdiction. In addition to which, if you select the right
jurisdiction, it may, in fact, be a violation of local law for
that trustee to comply with any court order that is not
rendered by their own courts.

Mr. David Aronofsky:
But that's a perfectly clean, no control instrument.
I doubt that any of us is really talking about that, here.
I'm talking about when the person against whom the order
is issued has some reach on either the assets or the
trustee.

Mr. Gideon Rothschild:
Well, let's talk about the different degrees of
control that a client might want to keep. In the first
instance in this bifurcated structure of the partnership
and the trust, we have David as the general partner. Now,
if in fact, the assets remained here under his control, it's
very clear that a U.S. court has jurisdiction over him, and
can compel him, if they wish to disregard this structure,
to liquidate the partnership and, disregarding the trust,
simply turn over those assets to the creditor. And that is
the reason why, if in fact we were simply to leave this
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structure alone if a problem arose in the future, there
wouldn't really be much asset protection available to
David, although I believe there should be. Because,
again, if we were to apply conflict of laws principles, and
the court were to apply-let's assume-Cook Islands' law
to that trust, then that trust and the trust's assets, i.e.,
the partnership interest the trust owns, should be
protected from his creditors.
But we see from the Brooks case and the Portnoy
case, that we can't rely on the courts ruling in our favor in
those types of situations, possibly. And so the game plan,
if you will, would be at the appropriate moment when a
threat develops, years in the future after we've set the
structure up, it would be advisable for the foreign trustee
to direct David, as the general partner, to liquidate the
partnership and move those assets offshore. Now this,
mind you, is before any court order or judgment rendered
against him. It's simply a safety procedure to get the
assets belonging to the trust out of the U.S. court's
jurisdiction. When that partnership is liquidated, David
receives his one percent interest, that is all he owns. The
ninety-nine percent interest that belongs to the trust is
transferred offshore, now out of David's control and in the
sole control of that foreign trustee, so that by the time the
plaintiff might discover the existence of this trust-which
is usually after a judgment is rendered against David
individually-the assets have been moved offshore out of
the U.S. court's jurisdiction.
Professor Jeffrey Schoenblum:
What if there is a letter of wishes or some other
understanding, and the court orders the individual debtor
to call up the bank in such and such place and say send
back the money, that would be my wish.
Mr. Gideon Rothschild:
I'm going to let Barry respond to that one.
Professor Jeffrey Schoenblum:
And if the results aren't forthcoming, what about
contempt or some other sort of punitive or coercive action.
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And maybe Eric might want to respond to some of that, as
well.

Mr. Barry Engel:
If you're my client, Professor, and this is just a
hypothetical, my advice to you would be to do everything
that the judge tells you to do. Don't mess around, he's a
very powerful person sitting up there. The way that
contempt law works, and this is very clear, and I had the
privilege of addressing about sixty distinguished judges in
Reno at the National Judicial College where they teach
judges how to judge and play golf, and play tennis, and all
sorts of things. And it was a strange sensation, telling
these people how contempt law works. I thought I could
be held in contempt of court following the program.
But,
anyway,
they
confirmed
in
private
conversation that this is it: the principle is that you
cannot be held in contempt of court if you do not have the
power or the ability to comply. That's the impossibility of
performance defense. It's a complete defense. There's an
exception to that defense, and that is the self-created
impossibility. Importantly, however, there has to be a link
in time, close link in time, between what you did to create
the impossibility and that specific order. So if today I do
something that in two years makes it impossible for me to
comply, I can't be held in contempt of court. If the judge
today orders me to bring those papers in next Tuesday,
and on my way to court that morning I stop by "Shredders
Are Us," and thereafter it's impossible to produce the
papers, I obviously created the impossibility within a close
nexus in time to that particular order. And under the
planning that we do, there is not going to be that link in
time, and we're not going to cut it so close that it's going
to be difficult to tell if there is a link in time between the
specific order and the inability to produce something.

Professor Jeffrey Schoenblum:
So even if there is proof of prior arrangement or
understanding, or an indication that all along in practice
the trustee is obedient to whatever request is made for
assets or anything else by the settlor, you don't feel that
that would have an effect?
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Mr. Barry Engel:
Well, we had that specific question brought to a
court not too long ago. And, in fact, in an article that
everybody should have on "Does Asset Protection Planning
Work" from the Journal of Asset Protection, we do have
some language from the transcript, page, what's listed as
twenty-four. And the judge says, "I've reviewed the law
regarding contempt and the standards that are required.
One thing I've learned a long time ago as a judge, you
never order something you can't enforce. And if we order
him to pay a million dollars, I have to be assured that's a
reasonable order. As a matter of fact, contempt law says
one should not issue orders that cannot be complied with.
I'd look pretty silly if I entered orders that couldn't be
enforced." That's from the transcript of a federal
proceeding.
And by the way, it was found that he couldn't.

Mr. Eric Henzy:
The trusts that I've seen, and I'm not sure what
Gideon or Barry put in their trusts, have not said the
trustee "shall"-it's the trustee "may." And so I think,
sure, it's a terrific remedy, and you could have a judge
order a settlor to ask a trustee to send assets back, and
either the trustee will or won't. But, again, the trusts that
I've seen-and I would think that it would be kind of a
drafting-

Professor Jeffrey Schoenblum:
This is what I'm getting at, the judge is pretty
shrewd. And he's thinking, well, I'll just threaten to throw
this guy in jail. Is the bank really on that other island
going to let this guy be thrown into jail?

Mr. Gideon Rothschild:
Let me give you a real case. There is a case in Las
Vegas where Mr. and Mrs. Anderson have been sitting in
jail-they just got out two weeks ago, actually-they have
been sitting in jail since last August for contempt of court.
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And they got out. And how did they get out? Because
eventually they must have sent a signal to the trustee,
somehow, to send the money back. This appears to be
another bad apple type of case. The F.T.C. had charged a
company they were selling for with civil and criminal fraud
and obtained a seizure order against them. When the
judge discovered the existence of this trust, and the fact
that the settlors, the Andersons, were the trustees who
had sole control over the trust's assets, and were only
discharged as trustees in the face of an order directing
them to bring the money back so that they could-

Mr. Eric Henzy:
So they created the impossibility right then.

Mr. Gideon Rothschild:
-they created this impossibility of performance. It
was their removal as trustees in the face of a court order
that threw them in jail. And it was not until they got the
money back from the trustee-approximately, I believe, a
million and a half dollars-that the judge released them
on the condition that they turn in their passports because
apparently there was a belief that there was still more
money offshore. And they were referred for criminal
prosecution to the Justice Department.
So this is not something that can be dealt with

lightly.
Mr. Barry Engel:
But there's a big difference in that design.
would never design your planning that way.

Mr. Gideon Rothschild:

Absolutely not.

You
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Professor Jeffrey Schoenblum:
One or two more questions, as I know that we're
running a little late, but this is very worthwhile and
enlightening.
How about the tax aspects? The tax aspects of an
asset protection trust from the American perspective?
Mr. Gideon Rothschild:
Actually, that's what, I believe, is the real reason
Alaska passed their legislation, and then Delaware copied
them. It was not because Alaska or Delaware wished to
become a debtor's haven. It was because they saw the
flight of money leaving this country for offshore places,
and they also saw, particularly Alaska, what was
happening in the dynasty trust planning arena. South
Dakota and Delaware were the leading states to attract
monies to their financial institutions because of the repeal
What that enabled
of the rule against perpetuities.

individuals to do is to run trusts out forever, unlike
individuals who reside in New York or most other
jurisdictions. There are now eight states that have
repealed the rule against perpetuities in the United States,
and Alaska, Delaware, and South Dakota are the leading
proponents of dynasty trusts simply because, in addition
to the repeal of the rule against perpetuities, they don't
have a state income tax for non-resident trusts.
Now, what does that mean insofar as why they had
to pass asset protection legislation? Why couldn't they
just repeal the rules against perpetuities in Alaska? The
reason is related to a quirk in the tax laws. The Internal
Revenue Code, the Regulations, and decisions and
revenue rulings that have been promulgated by the
Service and the courts over the last thirty years have ruled
that if a settlor creates a trust and retains a beneficial
interest, albeit a discretionary interest, does not retain
any other rights whatsoever, then if the creditors of the
settlor under local law can reach the trust assets, then
section 2036 will apply to pull back the trust's assets into
the settlor's estate. Also, the transfer to that trust would
not be deemed a completed gift, because the creditors
could reach it.
If we take that same rule of law, and look at the
corollary of that rule as it applies to a jurisdiction in
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which the creditors of the setfior can not reach the trust
assets, then the logical conclusion, from a tax perspective,
is that the transfer to the trust would be a completed gift
and it would be outside the settlor's estate at death. In
fact, in a private letter ruling issued in 1993 dealing with
a foreign trust, in which, under the jurisdiction's laws, the
creditors would not be able to reach the trust's assets,
and then in a 1998 private letter ruling issued last
August, dealing with an Alaska trust, the conclusion was
that these transfers were, in fact, completed gifts.
Although the 1998 ruling did not conclude what the effect
would be from an estate tax inclusion perspective,
discussions that I've had with George Masnick, whose
branch issued that ruling, indicate that the only reason
the Service did not opine on the estate tax inclusion, was
because it would depend on a facts and circumstances
test.
If, for example, the settlor received distributions on
a regular basis, section 2036 might apply finding an
implied agreement between the trustee and the settlor. If
there were no distributions to the settlor, on the other
hand, during the settlor's lifetime, then section 2036
should not apply, according to the Service. It is that
aspect of the tax law that the Alaska Trust Act impacts.
Because now, using Alaska-and perhaps Delaware,
although I'm not sure that Delaware has resolved some of
the issues-someone creating an Alaska trust can
accomplish significant estate tax benefits, by transferring
assets thereto. We all know that transferring assets
during lifetime is advantageous, because it gets all of the
future appreciation out of the settlor's estate. But the
biggest drawback to transferring assets for most people is
the uncertainty that the future might hold. By allowing
for a discretionary distribution to the settlor, if financial
circumstances were to change in the future, you are able
to accomplish, using an Alaska trust, what you might not
have been able to accomplish before, without going
offshore.
Professor Jeffrey Schoenblum:
To conclude this segment of the program, David,
can you tell us in terms of Montana's law, is it particularly
pertinent to persons practicing in the United States?
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Mr. David Aronofsky:
It will be, in my view, to the extent that persons
practicing in the United States are representing offshore
individuals, companies, financial institutions, and trusts.
Professor Jeffrey Schoenblum:
If you have a foreign client?
Mr. David Aronofsky:
Exactly. That is the focus of our law. Many of our
calls, and the ones that are coming to me these days, are
from Americans as much as offshore counsel, who have
these kinds of clients. They've all read the law by the time
they reach me, but they want to confirm that it really
means what it says, and how our courts react.
Professor Jeffrey Schoenblum:
How does it work with treaties?
Mr. David Aronofsky:
I would have said that until a couple of months
ago when I started reading these new law review articles
raising questions about the extent to which treaties do or
don't apply to states, as opposed to individuals whose
assets are within the jurisdiction of I.R.S., and I hope
everyone understands that distinction here, that tax
treaties would preempt state law. I guess to some extent
they still do, unless the state itself is the party that's

adverse to the I.R.S. in a proceeding. Then let me suggest
that this is an open question. Because our preemption
statute only goes to money laundering, not tax.
Professor Jeffrey Schoenblum:
So if the French government, under the FrenchU.S. Income Tax Treaty provision pertaining to Exchange
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of Information, asks for information on this account from
the I.R.S. or the government-

Mr. David Aronofsky:
Here's the way it would play out, I think. They
could get the information from a depository. They could
get the information, I suppose, from the depositor if and
when that person were within the jurisdiction of the U.S.
Could they get that information from the State of
Montana? Very, very questionable right now, if the state
didn't want to give it to them, because the state could
mount, in my judgment, an Eleventh Amendment
immunity defense, claiming that the I.R.S. lacks
jurisdiction under that treaty to get tax information from
the State.
Now, the way around it, of course, is for the tax
policy people with Treasury to go to their money
laundering colleagues with a suspected money laundering
allegation, to see whether the latter office would be willing
to seek the same information, at which point our
preemption statute probably would kick in. I'm not so
sure that tax information is as gettable right now from the
state as it would have been before the law was enacted.
Professor Jeffrey Schoenblum:
Questions.

Question:
From a policy point of view, if Mr. Eric Henzy is
right about the societal ills, then what can be done?
There is no bar to someone going offshore. What are you
suggesting be done?
Mr. Eric Henzy:
I don't think there's a lot that any U.S. government
can do about offshore trusts. I mean, I suppose you could
pass a law that says it's a crime to send your money to an
offshore trust. I don't think that's going to happen. So, I
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think the answer is, I don't think there's a lot you can do
for offshore trusts.
On the domestic trust front, though, say with
Alaska trusts, I think that the remedy is going to be court
judgments that find the spendthrift provisions in invalid.
What's going to be different from the offshore case is that
you're going to have federal courts that have personal
jurisdiction over those Alaska trustees. So those
judgments are going to be enforceable. And to the extent
that the domestic trusts are as successful as I'm sure the
legislatures that are passing them would like them to be,
and the practitioners that are doing them, you may see
some Congressional action. Because I think it's just not

going to be acceptable to have a small number of states
that are setting these systems up, and potentially having a
big impact on the liability systems in a whole bunch of
other states.
Question:
Barry, I was wondering if U.S. assets that the
ownership has been shipped offshore, have the same
protections as offshore assets in an offshore trust?
Mr. Barry Engel:
Whether U.S. assets that have been shipped
offshore have the sameProfessor Jeffrey Schoenblum:
Those assets that are held in an offshore trust
have the same protection-I think this is what you're
saying. Do U.S. assets held in an offshore foreign trust
have the same protection as assets that have been
shipped offshore themselves, and are held say in an
account offshore, as well as the trust being offshore?
Mr. Barry Engel:

Well, that goes back, I believe, to the distance
factor. I would say as a general principle, no. I have had
some of the test cases involve U.S.-held real estate, where
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we had very good results, even though it was U.S.-held
real estate. But clearly I think we can expect a much
greater degree of ultimate protection, if we're dealing with
things that can be moved if and when something happens.
Perhaps the question is, when should they be moved? My
strong bias is to have the movement take place today
offshore when there's nothing pending, threatened, or
expected. Most clients are reluctant to do that, perhaps
then I would suggest that they at least establish the
But clearly the more
offshore relationships today.
distance that exists today the more protection the
structure can be expected to provide.
Question:

I'm wondering whether anyone can discuss certain
practical problems, to which I've never had the answer so
far. If you're sitting offshore and you're approached by an
American, the question is, is this a good guy or a bad guy,
which boils down to, is he telling you the truth. And I
don't know how you deal with that. That's one of the
reasons why it seems to me to be an extraordinarily
dangerous kind of business, because if he turns out to be
a liar, you're going to end up having to convince the court
in the offshore place, as well as onshore, that you aren't
liable and quite conceivably criminally liable.
Mr. David Aronofsky:
The last thing I wrote in my paper for this
"know-your-customer"
the
addressed
conference,
controversy that has broken like a firestorm all over the
United States within the past thirty days, focusing on the
same question. Let me suggest, without an answer,
because two or three of our federal regulatory agencies
have proposed regulations which would require answers
and give the financial institutions the negative incentive, if
you will, to get the answers from the sources of money
coming into their account. The uproar and protest of
these regulations has been phenomenal, in my judgment,
from the press, from political figures, from financial
institutions, and from most people who even think that
their financial secrets, to the extent that they have any,
and most don't, are going to be disclosed to these federal
regulators and put into some big computer bank which is
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already happening anyway. But the point is, we don't
know how to answer that question in this country, so I
don't know how you would be expected to know how to
answer it in the Caymans.

Mr. Gideon Rothschild:
Let me maybe take a stab at it by telling you what I
do when I undertake client situations. First of all, we try
to vet clients out pretty carefully. Lets take, for example,
a client that came in my office about a year ago with his
lawyer. I start out by asking some preliminary basic
questions, what's your name, address, phone number,
what's your occupation. And when I started getting silent
responses to those questions asking very simple basic
information, the response I got was I'll tell you later, we

decide to go further. And I decided, well, this wasn't the
kind of response that I was looking for, and I pressed on
and asked the attorney-and it was then disclosed to me
that this individual had been indicted for criminal acts in
the past, and so I decided that he was not going to be a
future client of mine.
But on a serious note, what I do in each instance, I
look at the smell test, first of all. Who is the individual
being referred by? Did he come to me over the internet, or
did he come to me through a reputable attorney or
accountant that I've done business with in the past.
Secondly, I have him or her complete a questionnaire, a
detailed questionnaire that asks about background
information, whether there are any lawsuits. Whether
he's ever been a defendant in any actions, whether he's
filed all of his tax returns. I ask for copies of the last three
years of tax returns.
We then go ahead and do a
Lexis/Nexis search on the individual. Now, I admit that
that's a costly undertaking. It costs us about a thousand
dollars in Lexis fees to do this background search, and
that's part of the reason why the fees are what they are.
But I feel that there's a risk involved in undertaking each
one of these clients and I need to minimize that risk in
every way I can.
And lastly, the client is asked to sign an affidavit of
solvency. And I should add that I ask the client for a

balance sheet prepared by his accountant, to see if there
are any contingent liabilities, etc. So it's unlikely that I
would have allowed to be retained by a Portnoy or a
Brooks, knowing the situations that existed at that time.
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Mr. Barry Engel:
Just a comment. I think there's two parts to what
you said, first, the know-your-customer aspects. And I
don't know that we go as far as Gideon is describing,
although I think we do turn over a sufficient number of
stones to do more than we're required to do under our
law. But the know-your-customer issue is certainly a big
one for all of us. But your comment on the statute of
limitations and I wouldn't agree at all, that if you're on the
right side of the line there's no difference between two
years or six years. My clients want the comfort and the
confidence of knowing that once two years is gone, the

assets that they settled are going to be protected.
Because under our system, and I've seen it before, you
know, you give an American lawyer, an American litigator,
an opportunity and he'l turn that into ten opportunities.
And so if two years and two weeks has passed for a claim
to arise, and as far as he or she is concerned, there's still
four years to go, we're going to have litigation expenses
that we otherwise wouldn't have had to have incurred,
and we're going to have some aggravation and some
sleepless nights. Once the statute of limitations passes,
we're very comfortable knowing we can tell the other side
the statute ran a year ago, go tell it to the judge in the
Cook Islands.
Professor Jeffrey Schoenblum:
Professor Mary Daly.
Professor Mary Daly:
I just wanted to make a comment, if I could. As
you'll quickly learn tomorrow morning, I am not a
professor of trust law, but I am a professor of ethics and I
do dabble a little bit in sociology. I wanted to pick up on a
couple of points that were made earlier and see if I can tie
them together, especially Eric's point at the very beginning
about the bad laws.
One of the things that absolutely fascinates me, is
that in this discussion we have not heard names like
Vanderbilt, Carnegie, or Rockefeller. We heard about
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doctors, lawyers, and I assume, well-to-do plumbers. But
for the most part, we're hearing about ordinary people who
have accumulated an unusual amount of wealth. What
strikes me about all of this is that they're trying to isolate
themselves in a very particular way from the rest of
society. And what I'd like to suggest is that this is part of
a phenomenon that we all ought to be looking at and
thinking about, and that the sociologists are talking
about-and that's the gated community. The structure of
the U.S. society has changed in a very peculiar way over
the last twenty-five years. More doctors and lawyers and
wealthy plumbers are living in gated communities. These
communities have private police forces and private
schools. Their residents are removing themselves in very
particular ways from the rest of society. And asset
protection is part and parcel of that.
And to take it one step further, I will share with
you my own concern about lawyers removing themselves
from society. In the last five or so years, we've had a great
number of states adopt statutes that allow for limited
liability partnerships and limited liability corporations. In
part these statutes were a response to actions that were
brought by government regulators against law firms and
against the large accounting firms in connection with the
savings and loan crisis. What these statutes have done,
however, is to give us, as lawyers, and as law firms, very

unique sorts of protections, so that we can isolate
ourselves and our assets.
The sociologists of the legal profession have
insisted that one reason why we are allowed to selfregulate is because we've made a contract with society.
Society lets us self-regulate because we put our personal
assets on the line. We are partners in the traditional
sense, and if something goes wrong, if I give bad legal
advice, or my partner gives bad advice, our personal
assets are at risk. Limited liability partnerships and
limited liability corporations changed that. And what the
sociologists are saying is that five or ten years down the
road, we may see more outside regulations of the legal
profession, because we are no longer observing the
essential terms of the contract.
Mr. Gideon Rothschild:
I'd like to respond to that, if I may. I think the
answer to that perhaps may lie in things like mandatory
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malpractice insurance for lawyers. We already have
mandatory malpractice insurance for doctors in most
states. But that doesn't explain why someone in a
vulnerable position should not be able to limit their risk
exposure, by, say, forming an LLC. We have situations
today like the eight million dollar coffee cup verdict that
we've all read about. We've read about punitive damages
being awarded because a lawyer committed sexual
harassment. And the question really boils down to, are
we insurers to an unlimited degree of whatever
wrongdoing we might be accused of,' rightly or wrongly. I
think there are a lot of juries and judges that don't
necessarily apply the law properly in every instance. We
also have theories today that didn't exist years ago.
Twenty years ago we didn't have to worry about punitive
damages. We didn't have to worry about environmental
liabilities. We are exposed to more and more liabilities
today than ever before. -And I don't think that it's wrong
If the legislative
to be able to limit that exposure.
response to that is every attorney should have malpractice
insurance of two million dollars, and everyone that drives
a car should have liability insurance of two million dollars
at a minimum, then perhaps that would be fine as far as
I'm concerned. But I think that there's no reason why I
should pay ten million dollars for an injury that someone
sustains, when the next guy who causes the same injury,

may only have to dig out fifty thousand dollars because
that's all they're able to pay.
Mr. David Aronofsky:
That's not what's going on here, Gideon, in my
view. If it were just civil liability that could be insured
against you wouldn't have had the need to raise the
question and we wouldn't be in the asset protection
business at all. We're talking about an immense distrust,
in my view, of the federal, and to a lesser extent, state and
local government officials whose actions you can't insure
against. It's really that simple. I talk to people who feel
this distrust all the time in Montana because an
increasing number seem to be gravitating out there. It's
not why I moved there, but I'm in the minority. The fact of
the matter is, it's I.R.S., it's H.H.S. investigators of
Medicare fraud and abuse. Not that any has occurred,
but try telling that to a doctor who has just spent a million
dollars on a health care law firm after an audit that the
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doctor can't win, because how do you disprove the
negative, to use the question that comes up all the time in
law professing. No, I think what's driving this asset
protection industry, if you will, has much more to do with
concern about the government getting you, whether it
should or not, that you can't insure against, than it is
concern about private litigation liability, because the latter
is always insurable and the judges and juries have a
knack of making sure that justice is done in almost every
case in those situations. So it's the government, it's not
the private liability, in my judgment, that's doing it.
Mr. Barry Engel:
If I may, I think clients that I have seen who were
asset protection motivated certainly have a concern that
there might be the audit, there might be whatever, at the
government level. But I think for the most part, there's
just kind of a free-floating sense of anxiety, that, you
know, you never know what's going to happen. And I've
been in practice or business for twenty, thirty years. I've
been successful, I've built up a nice size estate, and I'm
going to be around for a while longer. And what are the
chances of somebody jumping on me from a great height
at some point, you know. Relatively high, if they're going
to be around in practice or business for another ten,
twenty, thirty years. So they say, oh, okay, I can spend
some money today and put myself in a position so that if
something happens my assets are not as exposed as they
would be if something were to happen tomorrow, I like
that, let's do that.

And I don't know if it's-I certainly appreciate and
respect your comments. My perspective is, it's not as
perhaps as heavy as the gated community or the like. I
think it's people simply saying I've worked hard, I've got it,
I've seen some weird stuff, I don't want to take any
chances.
Professor Jeffrey Schoenblum:
But implicit in that is the question, why do people
have to worry about that?
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Mr. Eric Henzy:
I take your point, sure.

Professor Jeffrey Schoenblum:
Ms. Carlyn McCaffrey.
Ms. Carlyn McCaffrey:
Sort of an attempt to the response of Professor
Mary Daly and to Eric. I'm not really sure that I know
where I come out of the morality of kind of self-protective,
asset protection process. But I think that when we're
thinking about it, we should keep in mind that the fact
that we don't see the Rockefellers and the Vanderbilts
setting up these trusts, we see the lawyers, the doctors
and the plumbers, is because the Rockefellers and the
Vanderbilts don't have to do it, because their parents did
it for them, and in virtually every state in the United
States it's perfectly legitimate and unchallengable for a
parent to set up an asset protection trust for her children.
Creditors can't reach them. And all we're talking about
here is whether the middle class, the upper middle class,
moving into the upper class can do the same thing for
themselves when they didn't have parents rich enough to
do it for them.

Mr. Eric Henzy:
Interesting perspective.
Mr. Gideon Rothschild:
And just to add to that, it's interesting to note that
in the research I did recently I discovered that, in
England, they still to this day invalidate spendthrift trusts
for a third party beneficiary. So we have a dichotomy here
between English law and American law, and who's to say
who's public policy is right or wrong.
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Professor Jeffrey Schoenblum:
Why weren't the Rockefellers reachable? Has there
been some government action since the time of the
Rockefellers that makes assets much more vulnerable?
Ms. Carlyn McCaffrey:
No, because if I happen to acquire enough money
as a Rockefeller myself today, I could do the same thing
for my children under the laws of every state of the United
States.
Professor Jeffrey Schoenblum:
Can't the government get to Rockefeller's assets
nowMs. Carlyn McCaffrey:
Not after I put them in the trust for my children.
And my children can be beneficiaries, and I can put it in
Delaware, and itll go on forever.

Mr. Gideon Rothschild:
You may not want to do that.
Mr. Eric Henzy:
You're making sort of a class argument, which I'm
not sure I'm really buying, becauseMs. Carlyn McCaffrey:
You're saying this process that the Rockefellers set
up for their children is as immoral as the plumber sets up
for himself?
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Mr. Eric Henzy:
Whatever my view of the Rockefeller's trust, I don't
think that because what the Rockefellers might bebecause they're doing it doesn't mean it's okay for other
people to do the self-settled trust idea over here. And you
know, my only one-the class thing that it's somehow or
other okay for doctors and lawyers and dentists to do it
because the Rockefeller's did it for their'kids. You know,
I'm just not seeing it.

Ms. Carlyn McCaffrey:
I'm not saying that. I just don't know whether you
think that the Rockefeller set up by their parents are
equally bad, or is there something worse about a trust
that you set up for yourself?

Mr. Eric Henzy:
It's hard for me to justify this, given what I've said.
But, for however many hundreds of years or whatever, the
principle has been that you can't set up a trust for your
own benefits, and that's what's being attacked or changed
right now. The principle has always been that the
Rockefellers could take their money and dump it into a
trust for the benefit of their kids. And I can't tell you

there's a great big distinction there.

I think the only

distinction is, is the idea that if you want to give your
money away you can give your money away. But if you
want to keep your money, you want to keep the beneficial
ownership of your money and your assets, then it's going
to be available to satisfy the claims of your creditors.
Am I in love with the idea that because one of the
Vanderbilt or the Rockefeller kids run somebody over and
they can't get them because they got all their money in
trusts that their parents set up, no, but you know, that's
how it is.

Professor Jeffrey Schoenblum:
Wasn't there a recent Mississippi decision-
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Mr. Gideon Rothschild:
Yes, the Sligh case.
Professor Jeffrey Schoenblum:
Could you comment?
Mr. Barry Engel:
Well, in fact there are a number of limitations to
the spendthrift trust rule, even in the United States. And
so it's not as black and white as one might first-what it
might first appear to be. There are tax agencies, the I.R.S.
can reach into a spendthrift trust, and the I.R.S., by the
way, has been successful into reaching into IRAs and
pension plans. And most recently in the Mississippi
case-

Mr. David Aronofsky:
Don't forget to cite the statute that reversed that.
Mr. Barry Engel:,
No, the Mississippi Supreme court upheld the
Sligh decision.
Mr. Gideon Rothschild:
It was the reverse statutoryMr. David Aronofsky.
But the legislation changed the law after the
decision.
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Mr. Barry Engel:
Oh, after the decision. Yes. There was a statute
that changed the law after the decision. But the
spendthrift trust rule was invaded prior to the statutory
change. But the self-settlor trust rule-the spendthrift
trust rule has been around for over a hundred years. And
yet there are judges that see it appropriate, under certain
circumstances, that it should not be preserved and
protected.

Professor Jeffrey Schoenblum:
And that was not a case involving-

Mr. Barry Engel:

That was a DWI tort. And the defendant didn't
have any assets, any resources to satisfy the claims of the
plaintiff. And his mother had set up this trust for him,
possibly knowing that he was reckless and likely to cause
injury to society. And the Mississippi Supreme Court held
that the trust should pay for his wrongs here.

Professor Jeffrey Schoenblum:

Thank you all very much.

